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The Epic Story of Maximum Likelihood
Stephen M. Stigler
Abstract. At a superficial level, the idea of maximum likelihood must
be prehistoric: early hunters and gatherers may not have used the words
“method of maximum likelihood” to describe their choice of where and
how to hunt and gather, but it is hard to believe they would have been
surprised if their method had been described in those terms. It seems
a simple, even unassailable idea: Who would rise to argue in favor of
a method of minimum likelihood, or even mediocre likelihood? And
yet the mathematical history of the topic shows this “simple idea” is
really anything but simple. Joseph Louis Lagrange, Daniel Bernoulli,
Leonard Euler, Pierre Simon Laplace and Carl Friedrich Gauss are
only some of those who explored the topic, not always in ways we
would sanction today. In this article, that history is reviewed from
back well before Fisher to the time of Lucien Le Cam’s dissertation.
In the process Fisher’s unpublished 1930 characterization of conditions
for the consistency and efficiency of maximum likelihood estimates is
presented, and the mathematical basis of his three proofs discussed.
In particular, Fisher’s derivation of the information inequality is seen
to be derived from his work on the analysis of variance, and his later
approach via estimating functions was derived from Euler’s Relation
for homogeneous functions. The reaction to Fisher’s work is reviewed,
and some lessons drawn.
Key words and phrases: R. A. Fisher, Karl Pearson, Jerzy Neyman,
Harold Hotelling, Abraham Wald, maximum likelihood, sufficiency, ef-
ficiency, superefficiency, history of statistics.
1. INTRODUCTION
In the 1860s a small group of young English intel-
lectuals formed what they called the X Club. The
name was taken as the mathematical symbol for the
unknown, and the plan was to meet for dinner once
a month and let the conversation take them where
chance would have it. The group included the Dar-
winian biologist Thomas Henry Huxley and the so-
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cial philosopher-scientist Herbert Spencer. One eve-
ning about 1870 they met for dinner at the Athenaeum
Club in London, and that evening included one ex-
change that so struck those present that it was re-
peated on several occasions. Francis Galton was not
present at the dinner, but he heard separate ac-
counts from three men who were, and he recorded
it in his own memoirs. As Galton reported it, dur-
ing a pause in the conversation Herbert Spencer
said, “You would little think it, but I once wrote a
tragedy.” Huxley answered promptly, “I know the
catastrophe.” Spencer declared it was impossible,
for he had never spoken about it before then. Huxley
insisted. Spencer asked what it was. Huxley replied,
“A beautiful theory, killed by a nasty, ugly little
fact” (Galton, 1908, page 258).
Huxley’s description of a scientific tragedy is sin-
gularly appropriate for one telling of the history
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Joe Hodges’s Nasty, Ugly Little Fact (1951)
Tn = X¯n if |X¯n| ≥ 1
n1/4
= αX¯n if |X¯n|< 1
n1/4
.
Then
√
n(Tn − θ) is asymptotically N(0,1) if θ 6= 0,
and asymptotically N(0, α2) if θ = 0.
Tn is then “super-efficient” for θ = 0 if α
2 < 1.
Fig. 1. The example of a superefficient estimate due to
Joseph L. Hodges, Jr. The example was presented in lectures
in 1951, but was first published in Le Cam (1953). Here X¯n is
the sample mean of a random sample of size n from a N(θ,1)
population, with nVar(X¯n) = 1 all n, all θ (Bahadur, 1983;
van der Vaart, 1997).
of Maximum Likelihood. The theory of maximum
likelihood is very beautiful indeed: a conceptually
simple approach to an amazingly broad collection
of problems. This theory provides a simple recipe
that purports to lead to the optimum solution for
all parametric problems and beyond, and not only
promises an optimum estimate, but also a simple
all-purpose assessment of its accuracy. And all this
comes with no need for the specification of a pri-
ori probabilities, and no complicated derivation of
distributions. Furthermore, it is capable of being
automated in modern computers and extended to
any number of dimensions. But as in Huxley’s quip
about Spencer’s unpublished tragedy, some would
have it that this theory has been “killed by a nasty,
ugly little fact,” most famously by Joseph Hodges’s
elegant simple example in 1951, pointing to the ex-
istence of “superefficient” estimates (estimates with
smaller asymptotic variances than the maximum like-
lihood estimate). See Figure 1. And then, just as
with fatally wounded slaves in the Roman Colos-
seum, or fatally wounded bulls in a Spanish bull-
ring, the theory was killed yet again, several times
over by others, by ingenious examples of inconsis-
tent maximum likelihood estimates.
The full story of maximum likelihood is more com-
plicated and less tragic than this simple account
would have it. The history of maximum likelihood
is more in the spirit of a Homeric epic, with long
periods of peace punctuated by some small attacks
building to major battles; a mixture of triumph and
tragedy, all of this dominated by a few characters
of heroic stature if not heroic temperament. For all
its turbulent past, maximum likelihood has survived
numerous assaults and remains a beautiful, if in-
creasingly complicated theory. I propose to review
that history, with a sketch of the conceptual prob-
lems of the early years and then a closer look at the
bold claims of the 1920s and 1930s, and at the early
arguments, some unpublished, that were devised to
support them.
2. THE EARLY HISTORY OF
MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD
By the mid-1700s it seems to have become a com-
monplace among natural philosophers that problems
of observational error were susceptible to mathe-
matical description. There was essential agreement
upon some elements of that description: errors, for
want of a better assumption, were supposed equally
able to be positive and negative, and large errors
were expected to be less frequently encountered than
small. Indeed, it was generally accepted that their
frequency distribution followed a smooth symmet-
ric curve. Even the goal of the observer was agreed
upon: while the words employed varied, the observer
sought the most probable position for the object of
observation, be it a star declination or a geodetic lo-
cation. But in the few serious attempts to treat this
problem, the details varied in important ways. It
was to prove quite difficult to arrive at a precise for-
mulation that incorporated these elements, covered
useful applications, and also permitted analysis.
There were early intelligent comments related to
this problem already in the 1750s by Thomases Simp-
son and Bayes and by Johann Heinrich Lambert
in 1760, but the first serious assault related to our
topic was by Joseph Louis Lagrange in 1769 (Stigler,
1986, Chapter 2; 1999, Chapter 16; Sheynin, 1971;
Hald, 1998, 2007). Lagrange postulated that obser-
vations varied about the desired mean according to
a multinomial distribution, and in an analytical tour
de force he showed that the probability of a set
of observations was largest if the relative frequen-
cies of the different possible values were used as the
values of the probabilities. In modern terminology,
he found that the maximum likelihood estimates of
the multinomial probabilities are the sample relative
frequencies. He concluded that the most probable
value for the desired mean was then the mean value
found from these probabilities, which is the arith-
metic mean of the observations. It was only then,
and contrary to modern practice, that Lagrange in-
troduced the hypothesis that the multinomial prob-
abilities followed a symmetric curve, and so he was
left with only the problem of finding the probabil-
ity distribution of the arithmetic mean when the
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error probabilities follow a curve. This he solved for
several examples by introducing and using “Laplace
Transforms.” By introducing restrictions in the form
of the curve only after deriving the estimates of
probabilities, Lagrange’s analysis had the curious
consequence of always arriving at method of mo-
ment estimates, even though starting with maxi-
mum likelihood! (Lagrange, 1776; Stigler, 1999, Chap-
ter 14; Hald, 1998, page 48.)
At about the same time, Daniel Bernoulli consid-
ered the problem in two successively very different
ways. First, in 1769 he tried using the hypothesized
curve as a weight function, in order to weight, then
iteratively reweight and average the observations.
This was very much like some modern robust M-
estimates. Second, in 1778 (possibly after he had
seen a 1774 memoir of Laplace’s with a Bayesian
analytical formulation), Bernoulli changed his view
dramatically and used the same curve as a density
for single observations. He multiplied these densities
together, and he sought as the true value for the
observed quantity, that value that made the prod-
uct a maximum (Bernoulli, 1769, 1778; Stigler, 1999,
Chapter 14; Laplace, 1774).
These and the other attempts of that time were
primarily theoretical explorations, and did not at-
tract many practical applications or further devel-
opment. And while they all used phrases that could
easily be translated into modern English as “Max-
imum Likelihood,” and in some cases even be de-
fended as maximum likelihood, in no case was there
a reasoned defense for them or their performance.
The most that was to be found was the superficial
invocation that the value derived was “most prob-
able” because it made the only probability in sight
(the probability of the observed data) as large as
possible.
The philosophically most cogent of these early
treatments was that of Gauss, in his first publica-
tion on least squares in 1809 (Gauss, 1809). Gauss,
like Daniel Bernoulli in 1778, adopted Laplace’s an-
alytical formulation, but unlike Bernoulli, Gauss ex-
plicitly invoked Laplace’s Bayesian perspective us-
ing a uniform prior distribution for the unknowns.
Where Laplace had then sought (and found) the
posterior median (which minimized the posterior ex-
pected error), Gauss chose the posterior mode. In
accord with modern maximum likelihood with nor-
mally distributed errors, this led Gauss to the method
of least squares. The simplicity and tractability of
the analysis made this approach very popular over
the nineteenth century. By the end of that century
this was sometimes known as the Gaussian method,
and the approach became the staple of many text-
books, often without the explicit invocation of a uni-
form prior that Gauss had seen as needed to justify
the procedure.
3. KARL PEARSON AND L. N. G. FILON
Over the 19th century, the theory of estimation
generally remained around the level Laplace and
Gauss left it, albeit with frequent retreats to lower
levels. With regard to maximum likelihood, the most
important event after Gauss’s publication of 1809
occurred only on the eve of a new century, with a
long memoir by Karl Pearson and Louis Napoleon
George Filon, published in the Transactions of the
Royal Society of London in 1898 (Pearson and Filon,
1898). The memoir has a place in history, more for
what in the end it seemed to suggest, rather than for
what it accomplished. The two authors considered a
very general setting for the estimation problem—a
set of multivariate observations with a distribution
depending upon a potentially large array of con-
stants to be determined. They did not refer to the
constants as parameters, but it would be hard for a
modern reader to view them in any other light, even
though a close reading of the memoir shows that it
lacked the parametric view Fisher was to introduce
more than 20 years later (Stigler, 2007).
The main result of Pearson and Filon (expressed
in modern terminology) came from taking a like-
lihood ratio (a ratio of the frequency distribution
of the observed data and the frequency distribu-
tion evaluated for the same data, but with the con-
stants slightly perturbed), expanding its logarithm
in a multivariate Taylor’s expansion, then approxi-
mating the coefficients by their expected values and
claiming that the resulting expression gave the fre-
quency distribution of the errors made in estimating
the constants. They erred in taking the limit of the
coefficients, in effect using a procedure that did not
at all depend upon the method of estimation used
and would at most be valid for maximum likelihood
estimates, a fact they failed to recognize. Their last
step employed an implicit Bayesian step in the man-
ner of Gauss. When cubic and higher order terms
were neglected, their formula would give a multivari-
ate normal posterior distribution (extending results
of Laplace a century earlier), although Pearson and
4 S. M. STIGLER
Filon cautioned against doing this with skewed fre-
quency distributions. A modern reader would recog-
nize their resulting distribution as the normal distri-
bution sometimes used to approximate the distribu-
tion of maximum likelihood estimates, but Pearson
and Filon made no such restriction in the choice of
estimate and applied it heedlessly to all manner of
estimates, particularly to method of moments esti-
mates.
The result may in hindsight be seen to be a mess,
not even applying to the examples presented, and
the approach was soon to be abandoned by Pear-
son himself. But it led to some correct results for
the bivariate normal correlation coefficient, and it
was bold and surely highly suggestive to a reader
like Ronald Fisher, to whom I now turn. I have re-
cently published a detailed study (Stigler, 2005) of
how Fisher was led to write his 1922 watershed work
on “The Mathematical Foundations of Theoretical
Statistics,” so I will only briefly review the main
points leading to that memoir.
4. R. A. FISHER
At Cambridge Fisher had studied the theory of er-
rors and even published in 1912 a short piece com-
mending the virtues of the Gaussian approach to
estimation, particularly of the standard deviation
of a normally distributed sample. He had been so
taken by the invariance of the estimates so derived,
how (for example) the estimate of the square of a
frequency constant was the square of the estimate
of the constant, that he termed the criterion “abso-
lute” (Fisher, 1912). But his approach at that time
was superficial in most respects, tacitly endorsing
the na¨ıve Bayesian approach Gauss had used, with-
out noticing the lurking inconsistency in even the
example he considered, in that the estimate of the
squared standard deviation based upon the distri-
bution of the data, namely 1n
∑
(xi − x¯)2, did not
agree with that found applying the same principle
to distribution of 1n
∑
(xi − x¯)2 alone.
Four years later, Fisher sent to Pearson for possi-
ble publication a short, equally superficial critique
of a Biometrika article by Kirstine Smith advocat-
ing the minimum chi-square approach to estimation
(Smith, 1916). Pearson’s thoughtful rejection letter
to Fisher focused on the lack of a clear and convinc-
ing rationale for the method of choosing constants to
maximize the frequency function, and Pearson even
stated that he now thought the Pearson–Filon paper
was remiss on the same count. He called particular
attention to a perceptive footnote in Smith’s paper
that argued the case against the Gaussian method:
the probability being maximized was not a proba-
bility but rather a probability density, an infinitesi-
mal probability, and of what force was such meager
evidence in defense of a choice? At least the mini-
mum chi-square method optimized with respect to
an actual metric. Two more years passed, and in
1918 Fisher discovered sufficiency in the context of
estimating the normal standard deviation (Fisher,
1920); he recalled Pearson’s challenge to produce a
rationale for the method, and he was off to the races,
quickly setting to work on the monumental paper on
the theory of statistics that he read to the Royal So-
ciety in November 1921 and published in 1922.
5. FISHER’S FIRST PROOF
By my reconstruction, Fisher’s discovery of suffi-
ciency was quickly followed by the development of a
short argument that he gave in that great 1922 pa-
per; indeed it was the first mathematical argument
in the paper. The essence of the argument in mod-
ern notation is the following. Suppose you have two
candidates as estimates for a parameter θ, denoted
by S and T . Suppose that T is a sufficient statistic
for θ. Since generally both S and T are approxi-
mately normal with large samples, let us (anticipat-
ing a species of argument Wald was to develop rig-
orously in 1943) follow Fisher in considering that S
and T actually have a bivariate normal distribution,
both with expectation = θ, and with standard devi-
ations σS and σT and correlation ρ. Then the stan-
dard facts of the bivariate normal distribution tell
us that E(S|T = t) = θ+ρ(σS/σT )(t−θ). Since T is
sufficient, this cannot depend upon θ, which is only
possible if ρ(σS/σT ) = 1, or if σT = ρσS ≤ σS . Thus
T cannot have a larger mean squared error than any
other such estimate S, and so must be optimum ac-
cording to a clear metric criterion, expected squared
error! In one stroke Fisher had (if one accepts the
substitution of exact for approximate normality) the
simple and powerful result:
Sufficiency implies optimality, at least when
combined with consistency and asymptotic
normality.
The question was, how general is this result? Nei-
ther Fisher nor much of posterity thought of con-
sistency and asymptotic normality as major restric-
tions. After all, who would use an inconsistent esti-
mate, and while there are noted exceptions, is not
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asymptotic normality the general rule? Indeed, Fisher
clearly knew the result was stronger than this, that
a sufficient estimate captured all the information in
the data in even stronger senses; the argument was
only to present the claim in terms of a specific cri-
terion, minimum standard error. But what about
sufficiency?
At this point Fisher appears to have made an in-
teresting and highly productive mistake. He quickly
explored a number of other parametric examples and
came to the conclusion that maximizing the likeli-
hood always led to an estimate that was a function
of a sufficient statistic! When he read the paper to
the Royal Society in November 1921, his abstract, as
printed in Nature (November 24, 1921) emphatically
stated, “Statistics obtained by the method of maxi-
mum likelihood are always sufficient statistics.” And
from this it would follow, with the minor quibble
that perhaps consistency and asymptotic normality
may be needed, that maximum likelihood estimates
are always optimum. A truly beautiful theory was
born, after over a century and a half in gestation.
Even as the paper was being readied for press,
doubts occurred to the one person best equipped
to understand the theory, Fisher himself. The bold
claim of the abstract does not appear in the pub-
lished version; neither does its denial. He expressed
himself in this way:
“For the solution of problems of estima-
tion we require a method which for each
particular problem will lead us automati-
cally to the statistic by which the criterion
of sufficiency is satisfied. Such a method
is, I believe, provided by the Method of
Maximum Likelihood, although I am not
satisfied as to the mathematical rigour of
any proof which I can put forward to that
effect. Readers of the ensuing pages are
invited to form their own opinion as to
the possibility of the method of maximum
likelihood leading in any case to an insuf-
ficient statistic. For my own part I should
gladly have withheld publication until a
rigourously complete proof could be for-
mulated; but the number and variety of
new results which the method discloses
press for publication, and at the same time
I am not insensible of the advantage which
accrues to Applied Mathematics from the
co-operation of the Pure Mathematician,
and this co-operation is not infrequently
called forth by the very imperfections of
writers on Applied Mathematics” (Fisher,
1922, page 323).
The 1922 paper did present several related argu-
ments in addition to the Waldian one I reported
above. It stated less boldly a converse of the state-
ment in the 1921 abstract that, “it appears that
any statistic which fulfils the condition of sufficiency
must be a solution obtained by the method of the op-
timum [e.g. maximum likelihood]” (page 331). But
Fisher did not now claim that a sufficient statis-
tic need always exist. Instead Fisher gave an im-
proved non-Bayesian version of the Pearson–Filon
argument for asymptotic normality, expanding the
likelihood function about the true value and point-
ing out how and why the argument requires max-
imum likelihood estimates (and that it would not
apply to moment estimates), and how it could be
used to assess the accuracy of maximum likelihood
estimates (pages 328–329). And there, in a long foot-
note, he called Karl Pearson to task for not earlier
calling attention himself to the error in the 1898
paper. Fisher noted that in 1903 Pearson had pub-
lished correct standard errors for moment estimates,
even while citing the 1898 paper without noting that
the standard errors given in 1898 for several exam-
ples were wrong. In the 1922 paper Fisher also point-
edly included a section illustrating the use of maxi-
mum likelihood for Pearson’s Type-III distributions
(gamma distributions), contrasting his results with
the erroneous ones Pearson and Filon had given in
1898 for the same family.
6. THREE YEARS LATER
By 1925 Fisher’s earlier optimism had faded some-
what, and he prepared a revised version of his the-
ory for presentation to the Cambridge Philosophical
Society. At some point in the interim he had recog-
nized that sufficient statistics of the same dimension
as the parameter did not always exist. What led to
this realization? Fisher did not say, although in a
1935 discussion he wrote, “I ought to mention that
the theorem that if a sufficient statistic exists, then
it is given by the method of maximum likelihood was
proved in my paper of [1922]. . . . It was this that led
me to attach especial importance to this method. I
did not at that time, however, appreciate the cases
in which there is no sufficient statistic, or realize that
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other properties of the likelihood function, in addi-
tion to the position of its maximum, could supply
what was lacking” (Fisher, 1935, page 82). I spec-
ulate that he learned this in considering a problem
where no sufficient statistic exists, namely the prob-
lem that figured prominently in the 1925 paper, the
estimation of a location parameter for a Cauchy dis-
tribution. In any event, in that 1925 paper Fisher
did not dwell on this discovery of insufficiency; quite
the contrary. The possibility that sufficient statistics
need not exist was only casually noted as a fact 14
pages into the paper, and a reader of both the 1922
and 1925 papers might not even notice the subtle
shift in emphasis that had taken place.
Where in 1922 Fisher started with consistency and
sufficiency, in 1925 he began with efficiency. Writing
of consistent and asymptotically normal estimates,
he stated, “The criterion of efficiency requires that
the fixed value to which the variance of a statistic
(of the class of which we are speaking) multiplied by
n, tends, shall be as small as possible. An efficient
statistic is one for which this criterion is satisfied”
(page 703). With this in mind, his main claim now
was (page 707), “We shall see that the method of
maximum likelihood will always provide a statistic
which, if normally distributed in large samples with
variance falling off inversely to the sample number,
will be an efficient statistic.”
Thus in 1925 the theory said that if there is an
efficient statistic, then the maximum likelihood es-
timate is efficient. When a sufficient and consistent
estimate exists, it will also be maximum likelihood,
but that is not necessary for efficiency. He granted
that more than one efficient estimate could exist,
but he repeated a proof he had already given in 1924
(Fisher, 1924a) that any two efficient estimates are
correlated with correlation that approaches 1.0 as n
increases.
7. THE 1925 “ANOVA” PROOF
What did Fisher offer by way of proof of this
new efficiency-based formulation? His 1922 treat-
ment had leaned crucially on sufficiency, but that
was no longer generally available. In its place he
depended upon a new and limited but mathemati-
cally rather clever proof that I will call the “analy-
sis of variance proof.” The proof was clearly based
upon a probabilistic version of the analysis of vari-
ance breakdown of a sum of squares that Fisher was
developing separately at about the same time for
agricultural field trials. Fisher’s own 1925 presenta-
tion of the argument is fairly opaque and does not
explain clearly its underlying logic; in 1935 he gave
an improved presentation that helps some (Fisher,
1935, pages 42–44). The mathematical details of the
proof have been clearly re-presented by Hinkley (1980)
at some length. I will be content to offer only a
sketch emphasizing the essence of the argument, what
I believe to be the logical development Fisher had in
mind. It will help the historical discussion to divide
his 1925 argument into two parts, just as Fisher did
in the 1935 version.
Let f(x;θ) be the density of a single observa-
tion, and let φ be the likelihood function for a sam-
ple of n independent observations, so that log φ=
Σlog f . Following Fisher, let X = 1φ
∂φ
∂θ =
∂
∂θ logφ—
what we now sometimes refer to as the score func-
tion. Fisher was only concerned here with situations
where the maximum likelihood estimate could be
found from solving the equation X = 0 for θ. The
first part of the argument was really more of a re-
statement of what he had shown in 1922: from ex-
panding the score function in a Taylor series, he had
that the score function was approximately a linear
function of the maximum likelihood estimate; as he
put it, X = −nA(θ − θˆ) “if θ − θˆ is a small quan-
tity of order n−1/2,” where his −nA denoted what
we now call the Fisher Information in a sample,
I(θ). Since under fairly general regularity conditions
E(X) =
∫ 1
φ
∂φ
∂θφ =
∫ ∂φ
∂θ =
∂
∂θ
∫
φ = ∂∂θ1 = 0, we also
have Var(X) = I(θ). As Fisher noted, I(θ) may be
found from any of the alternative expressions
I(θ) =−E
(
∂2 logφ
∂θ2
)
=E
(
∂ logφ
∂θ
)2
=−nE
(
∂2 log f
∂θ2
)
= nE
(
∂ log f
∂θ
)2
.
Fisher did not discuss conditions under which the
linear approximation would prove adequate; he was
content to exploit it as a simple route to the asymp-
totic distribution of the maximum likelihood esti-
mate, namely N(θ,1/I(θ)). Thus far he had not
gone beyond the 1922 argument.
The part of the argument that was novel in 1925,
the “ANOVA proof,” then went as follows: Let T
be any estimate of θ, assumed to be consistent and
asymptotically normal N(θ,V ). In the proof Fisher
used this as the exact distribution of T , and further
treated V as not depending upon θ, as would ap-
proximately be the case for “reasonable” estimates
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T in what we now call “regular” parametric prob-
lems. Fisher considered the score function X as a
function of the sample and looked at its variation
over different samples in two ways. The first was
to consider the total variation of X over all sam-
ples, namely its variance Var(X) = I(θ). And for
the second, he evaluated Var(X|T ), the conditional
variation in X given the value of T for the sam-
ple (i.e., the variance of X among all samples that
give the same value for T ). From this he computed
E[Var(X|T )], which he found equal to Var(X) −
1/V . Since Var(X) = E[Var(X|T )] + Var[E(X|T )]
(this is the ANOVA-like breakdown I refer to), this
would give Var[E(X|T )] = 1/V . But Var(X|T ) ≥ 0
always, which implies that necessarily E[Var(X|T )]≥
0, and so Var(X)− 1/V ≥ 0. This gave 1V ≤ I(θ), or
V ≥ 1I(θ) for any such T , with equality for efficient
estimates—what we now refer to as the information
inequality. Thus if the maximum likelihood estimate
indeed has asymptotic variance 1/I(θ), he had es-
tablished efficiency.
The logic of the proof—and the likely route that
led Fisher to it—seems clear. If there were a suf-
ficient statistic S, then the factorization theorem
(which Fisher had recognized in 1922, at least in
part) would give φ= C · h(S;θ), where the propor-
tionality factor C may depend upon the sample but
not on θ. By sufficiency, X would then depend upon
the sample only through S, and so Var(X|S) = 0 for
all values of S, and consequently E[Var(X|S)] = 0
also. Also, if S is sufficient, the maximum likeli-
hood estimate (found through solving X = 0 for θ)
is a function of S. The failure of T to capture all
of the information in the sample is then reflected
through the variation in the values of X given T ,
namely through Var(X|T ) and thus E[Var(X|T )].
This latter quantity plays the role of a residual sum
of squares and measures the loss of efficiency of
T over S (or at least over what would have been
achievable had there been a sufficient statistic).
What is more, this interpretation gave Fisher a
target to pursue in trying to measure the amount
of lost information, or even to determine how one
might recover it, just as in an analysis of variance
one can advance the analysis by introducing fac-
tors that lead to a decrease in the residual sum of
squares. In the remainder of the 1925 paper Fisher
pursued just such courses. He introduced both the
term and the concept of an ancillary statistic, in
effect as a covariate designed to reduce the resid-
ual sum of squares toward its theoretical minimum
achievable value. He gave particular attention to
multinomial problems and focused on a study of
the information loss when no sufficient estimate ex-
isted, and the loss in information in using an esti-
mate that was efficient but not maximum likelihood
(e.g., a minimum chi-square estimate). He found the
latter difference tended to a finite limit, a measure
of what C. R. Rao (1961, 1962) was later to term
“second-order efficiency.”
By 1935 Fisher evidently had come to see the first
part of the argument—the part establishing that the
maximum likelihood estimate actually achieved the
lower bound 1/I(θ)—as unsatisfactory, and he of-
fered in its place a different argument to show the
bound was achieved. That argument (Fisher, 1935,
pages 45–46) was derived from what I will call his
third proof; I shall comment on it later in that con-
nection.
Fisher’s 1925 work was conceptually deep and has
been the subject of much fruitful modern discussion,
particularly by Efron (1975, 1978, 1982, 1998), Efron
and Hinkley (1978) and Hinkley (1980).
8. AFTER 1925: CORRESPONDENCE
WITH HOTELLING
Fisher’s beautiful theory had become more com-
plicated but was still quite attractive. The proofs
Fisher offered in 1925 were not such as would sat-
isfy the Pure Mathematician he had referred to in
1922, nor would they withstand the challenges that
would come a quarter century later. Were they all
that he could offer? To answer this, it would help us
to listen in on a dialogue between Fisher and a non-
hostile, highly intelligent party. Many in the audi-
ence in England who were interested in this question
had axes to wield, and Fisher’s transparent digs at
Karl Pearson, even though they came in the form of
legitimately pointing out major errors in Pearson’s
previous work, just set those axes a-grinding. But
there was one reader who approached Fisher’s level
as a mathematician and was so distant both geo-
graphically (he was in California) and scientifically
(he was working on crop estimating at that time)
that he was able to engage in just such a dialogue.
I refer to Harold Hotelling.
Hotelling received his Ph.D. from Princeton Uni-
versity in 1924, for a dissertation in point set topol-
ogy. In that same year he joined the Food Research
Institute at Stanford University, where he worked
on agricultural problems. Soon after, he discovered
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Fisher through Fisher’s 1925 book, Statistical Meth-
ods for Research Workers. Hotelling reviewed that
book for JASA; in fact he reviewed each of the first
seven editions and the first three of these were volun-
teered reviews, not requested by the Editor
(Hotelling, 1951). He started up a correspondence
with Fisher, and tried unsuccessfully to get Fisher
to visit Stanford in 1928 and 1929 (Stigler, 1999a).
After several friendly exchanges of letters, on Octo-
ber 15, 1928, Fisher (who had had several requests
from others for detailed mathematical proofs) wrote,
asking Hotelling, “Now I want your considered opin-
ion as to the utility of collecting such scraps of the-
ory as are needed to prove just what is wanted for
my practical methods.” Hotelling replied Decem-
ber 8, strongly encouraging such a work as valu-
able for mathematics generally, and stated that “a
knowledge of the grounds for belief in a theory helps
to dispel the absurd notions which tend to clus-
ter even about sound doctrines.” Fisher’s Christmas
Eve 1928 reply proposed that they collaborate:
24 Dec ’28
Dear Prof. Hotelling
Your letter has arrived on Christmas Eve,
and has given me plenty to think about for the
holidays. You will not expect too much of my
answer, as you see that I am writing first and
thinking afterwards; but I can see already that
I have a great deal to thank you for.
After a few hours consideration I believe my
right course is to send you a draft contents, to
be pulled to pieces or recast as much as you
like, and to say I will do my best to fill the bill
if you will be joint author and be responsible
for the pure mathematics. If you consent to this
and to taking the first decision, like an editor,
as to inclusion or exclusion, on the clear under-
standing that either of us may throw it up as
soon as we think it is not worth while, I will
start sending stuff in. It will be mostly new as
many of the proofs can be done much better
than in my old publications.
Have you all my old stuff? I believe you have,
but if not I will try to find anything still lack-
ing.
It seems a monstrous lot of work, but I will
not grumble if I need not think too much about
arrangement.
Yours sincerely
R. A. Fisher
[Hotelling Papers Box 3]
Fisher’s draft table of contents is given as Ap-
pendix 1 below. That work was never to be com-
pleted. There was no apparent split between the two,
but as the project went on, Fisher’s increasing focus
on genetics as his 1930 book The Genetical Theory
of Natural Selection went through the press, and
Hotelling’s move in 1931 to the Department of Eco-
nomics at Columbia University, were likely causes
for the drop in interest. By February 1930 Fisher
was writing, “It is a grind getting anything seri-
ous done in the way of a text book; I hope you
will stick to yours, though; as well as developing
the purely mathematical developments.” Nonethe-
less, Hotelling spent nearly six months at Rotham-
sted over the last half of 1929 and saw quite a bit
of Fisher over that time. Hotelling returned to the
United States in late December in time to submit a
paper to the American Mathematical Society (AMS)
and present it at their meeting in Des Moines, De-
cember 31. That paper was entitled, “The consis-
tency and ultimate distribution of optimum statis-
tics”; that is, on the consistency and asymptotic nor-
mality of maximum likelihood estimates. It was pub-
lished in the October 1930 issue of the Transactions
of the AMS.
It is a reasonable guess that the approach taken
in the paper reflected Fisher’s views to some degree,
coming directly after the long visit with Fisher, al-
though Fisher apparently played no direct role in the
writing. At any rate, when Fisher wrote to Hotelling
on the 7th of January in 1930 to thank him for a
copy, Fisher’s only complaint was that the definition
of “consistency” Hotelling gave was slightly different
from Fisher’s. Fisher wrote,
“It is worth noting to avoid future con-
fusion that you are using consistency in
a somewhat different sense from mine. To
me a statistic is inconsistent if it tends
to the wrong limit as the sample is in-
creased indefinitely. I do not think I have
ever attempted to apply the distinction of
consistency or inconsistency to statistics
which tend to no limit, whereas you call
them all inconsistent. Thus I should not
call the mean of a sample from
1
pi
dx
1 + (x−m)2
an inconsistent statistic, though you would.
Congratulations on a very fine paper.”
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Hotelling’s paper is little referred to today, which
seems a shame. It is beautifully written, as was most
of Hotelling’s work, and among other things he ex-
plained Fisher’s own work on this topic more clearly
than Fisher ever did. He reviewed Fisher’s proof
of asymptotic normality (the one based upon the
Pearson–Filon approach), and he gently noted that
“it is not clear what conditions, particularly of con-
tinuity, are necessary in order that the proofs which
have been given shall be valid.” To repair this omis-
sion Hotelling offered two explicit proofs for the case
of one continuous variable, stating overconfidently
that “the extensions to any number of variables are
perfectly obvious; and the corresponding theorems
for discrete variables follow immediately. . . .” The
problem is, as Hotelling’s clear exposition makes ap-
parent to a modern reader, the proof does not work.
He simplified the problem by transforming the pa-
rameter space to a finite interval (if necessary) by
an arc tangent transformation, and discretized the
observed variable by grouping in a finite number of
small intervals, and did not realize that the two com-
bined do not ensure the uniformity he would need to
achieve the desired result for other than discrete dis-
tributions with bounded parameter sets. The error
evidently came to Hotelling’s attention by 5 Decem-
ber 1931, when he circulated a list of 37 “Outstand-
ing Problems in the Theory of Statistics.” Problem
#16 on the list was, “Prove the validity of the dou-
ble limiting process used in the proof of (Hotelling,
1930), for as general a situation as possible.”
9. THE GEOMETRIC SHADOW OF A NASTY
LITTLE FACT
To this point there had been not even a hint of
the future appearance of any nasty, ugly little fact
that might sully the beautiful theory. But then, on
November 15, 1930, Hotelling wrote to Fisher with
some pointed questions. The letter reflected a geo-
metric view of the inference problem that Hotelling
seems to have found in Fisher’s work by 1926 and de-
veloped further after their conversations at Rotham-
sted. Hotelling gave one statement of the view in
his 1930 paper (which must have been drafted at
Rothamsted), and he restated it in his November let-
ter in different but equivalent notation. The essence
is captured by Figure 2, drawn to display what
Hotelling conveyed in words and symbols.
Hotelling considered a parameterized multinomial
problem with m cells, where the observations are a
vector of relative frequencies of counts x= (x1, . . . ,
xm) taking values in the m-dimensional simplex∑m
t=1 xt = 1, xt ≥ 0 all t. Let the probabilities of
the cells f(p) = (f1(p), . . . , fm(p)) depend upon a
parameter p; this describes a curve in the simplex
as p varies. Let p= p0 denote the true value of the
parameter, let pˆ be the maximum likelihood esti-
mate of p, and let f(p0) and f(pˆ) be the points
on the curve corresponding to these two values. In
his 1930 paper, Hotelling stated further, “The like-
lihood L is constant over a system of approximately
spherical hypersurfaces about [x]. The point [f(pˆ)]
is the point of the curve which lies on the smallest
of the approximate spheres meeting the curve, and
is therefore approximately the nearest point on the
curve to [x]” (Hotelling, 1930).
Here then is how Hotelling raised his question in
correspondence, in the context of what must have
been a shared frame of discourse they had adopted
at Rothamsted.
Dear Dr. Fisher:
Thank you very much for your recent letter,
with graph and data.
I have been examining various problems in
Maximum Likelihood of late; I wonder if you
can enlighten me as to the conditions under
which your proof holds good regarding the min-
imum variance of statistics obtained by this
method, or rather, as to the exact meaning of
the theorem. One of several questions is whether
the variance of a statistic or its mean square de-
viation from the true value should be used as
a measure of accuracy.
Denoting by pˆ the optimum estimate of a pa-
rameter p, whose true value is p0, can it be
said that the variance of pˆ, assuming pˆ nor-
mally distributed, is less than that of any other
function of the same observations? Obviously
not without further qualification, since a func-
tion of the observations can be defined having
an arbitrarily small variance. We must there-
fore restrict the comparison to a special class
of functions suitable for estimating p, but the
definition of this class must not involve p0. How
should the class be defined? As the class of con-
sistent statistics? If so, the following difficulty
must be faced.
Consider a distribution of frequency among a
finite number m of classes, involving a param-
eter p. In a sample of n, let xt be the number
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Fig. 2. A reconstruction of Hotelling ’s geometric view of the multinomial estimation problem, circa Fall 1929. Here x
represents a multinomial observed relative frequency vector in the simplex, and the curve f(p) the potential values of the
multinomial probability vector; the true value of the parameter p (p0) is shown, as is the MLE and a contour of the likelihood
surface.
[Hotelling evidently means relative frequency]
falling in the tth class. Let ft(p) be the proba-
bility of an individual falling into this class. If
we take x1, . . . , xm as coordinates in m-space,
the equations
xt = ft(p) (t= 1, . . . ,m)
represent a curve with p as parameter. The
points corresponding to samples will form a
“globular cluster” (as you so well put it in 1915)1
about that point on the curve for which p =
p0. The method of maximum likelihood cor-
responds approximately, for large samples, to
taking for pˆ the parameter of the point of the
curve nearest to that representing the sample;
i.e., to projecting orthogonally. Now consider
some other method of projecting sample points
upon the curve; for example an orthogonal pro-
jection followed by an alternate stretching and
contracting along the curve. Then if p0 hap-
pens to give a point in one of the regions of
condensation [i.e. high density], this method of
estimation will, for sufficiently large samples,
yield a statistic with smaller variance than that
by the method of maximum likelihood. To be
sure, its variance will be larger if the true value
p0 lies in a region of rarefaction [i.e. low den-
sity], and averaging for different possible values
1Here Hotelling evidently refers to Fisher’s use in Fisher
(1924, at page 101) of the evocative astronomical term “glob-
ular cluster” to describe a point cloud. Fisher (1924) used the
term in summarizing the multiple dimensional space approach
he had taken in Fisher (1915). Fisher did not use the term in
Fisher (1915), although it would have been appropriate there
also.
of p0 might indicate a greater average variance
than that of the optimum statistic. But such
an averaging would seem to be of a piece with
“Bayes’ Theorem,” in supposing equal a priori
probabilities.
Hotelling went on to state that even in the par-
ticular case of symmetric beta densities, maximum
likelihood failed to be optimum, but his derivation
there was marred by a simple error in differentia-
tion. Before he received Fisher’s reply of the 28th of
November, 1930, Hotelling wrote again, on Decem-
ber 12, correcting his own error with regard to the
beta estimation problem and enlarging on his other
comment, to the point of rather clearly speculating
on the possibility of superefficient estimates.
The general question of the exact cir-
cumstances in which optimum statistics
have minimum variance. . . is extremely in-
teresting. That the property is not per-
fectly general seems clear from a consid-
eration of some of the distributions hav-
ing discontinuities; and also from the fact
that, if the true value were known, a sys-
tem of estimation could be devised which
would give it with arbitrarily small vari-
ance; and such a system of estimation might
happen to be adopted even if the true
value were unknown.
I have two students working on the op-
timum estimates of m for the above curve
and for the Type III case you treated.
Failing to get anything of consequence for
small samples by purely mathematical meth-
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ods, they will probably soon resort to ex-
periment.2
Cordially yours,
Harold Hotelling
Hotelling’s letters posed a challenging question in
a direct but nonconfrontational way. Clearly, Hotelling
said, some more constraints on the class of estimates
would be needed; the geometric view they had ev-
idently shared at Rothamsted suggested that con-
sistency alone was not enough. There is no obvi-
ous guarantee that the curve f(p) and the contours
of the likelihood are such that improvement over
maximum likelihood is not possible. What would
be needed to prevent this, or at least to convince a
reader such as Hotelling that the worry was ground-
less? Hotelling’s hypothetical improvements were cer-
tainly vague. A modern reader might be tempted
to see them as foreshadowing Hodges’s estimate or
even shrinkage via Stein estimation, but even though
they fall short of that, they presented a clear chal-
lenge to Fisher.
10. FISHER’S REPLY: A THIRD PROOF OF
THE EFFICIENCY OF MAXIMUM
LIKELIHOOD
By 1930 Fisher was no stranger to challenges by
skeptical readers. His general reaction to one from a
friendly source was to state clearly what he was pre-
pared to say, while avoiding speaking directly to the
point raised. Without addressing the criticism, much
less admitting its validity, he would move directly to
a new and improved position, often not giving any
indication that it represented the strongest state-
ment that could be made and perhaps even hinting
otherwise or at least allowing the reader to speculate
so. Such was the case here.
Fisher’s reply to the first of Hotelling’s letters was
brief, but it included one enclosure (A) that outlined
a new proof that illuminated Fisher’s views, as well
as a second short note (B) correcting Hotelling’s er-
ror in differentiating the beta density.
28 November 1930
Dear Hotelling,
I enclose two notes A and B on the
points you raise. The first brings in the
2From comments elsewhere in the correspondence it is clear
that by “experiment” Hotelling means simulation with dice or
cards.
general variances and covariances for the
multinomial, and is done more prettily by
replacing the multinomial by a multiple
Poisson,3 but the argument is probably
clearer as it stands.
This is a very short note; the meat of
my letter is in the enclosures. . . . .
Yours sincerely,
R. A. Fisher
[Hotelling Papers Box 45]
Fisher’s Enclosure A presented a sketch of a new,
third proof of the efficiency of maximum likelihood,
one that took a different point of attack. The argu-
ment, given in toto as Appendix 2 below, was el-
egant, geometric, and I believe also correct, or at
least completable, under the tacit regularity condi-
tions implied by the analysis. The geometric stance
he took was that which he and Hotelling would have
discussed at Rothamsted, restricted to the case of
a parametric multinomial family of distributions.
Without any discussion, but in evident reply to
Hotelling’s request for further restrictions on the
class of estimates allowed in order to rule out nasty
little facts of the sort Hotelling had hinted at, Fisher
did introduce a new restriction on the class of esti-
mates T for which the result was claimed. As Fisher
put it, the estimates under consideration were now
assumed to be homogeneous functions T = φ(x1, . . . ,
xs) of degree zero, where (x1, . . . , xs) is the vector
of counts. This, and the tacitly assumed smooth dif-
ferentiability, gave him access to a number of simple
relationships leading to a conclusion he summarized
as follows:
“The criterion of consistency thus fixes
the value of T at all points on the expec-
tation line, while the criterion of efficiency
in conjunction with it fixes the direction in
which the equistatistical surface cuts that
line. All statistics which are both consis-
tent and efficient thus have surfaces which
touch on that line. The surface for Maxi-
mum Likelihood has the plane surface of
this type.”
A homogeneous function φ of degree h is one where
φ(cx, cy, . . .) = chφ(x, y, . . .), and in the applied math-
ematics of Fisher’s day their principal advantage was
3An analytical trick he had introduced in Fisher (1922a),
see also the revised footnote in the reprinting of this paper in
Fisher (1974).
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that if differentiable, they satisfied Euler ’s Relation
xφx+ yφy+ zφz+ · · ·= hφ(x, y, z, . . .), where φx de-
notes the partial derivative of φ with respect to x
(see, e.g., Courant, 1936, Vol. 2, pages 108–109). In
Fisher’s case, the homogeneous functions φ of de-
gree zero would be functions of the sample relative
frequencies only, and would not otherwise depend
upon the sample size n. This might be considered a
strong restriction upon the class of estimates (Fisher
did not comment upon this), but with the assumed
differentiability and Euler’s Relation with h= 0, and
the exactly known covariances for the multinomial,
Fisher had an easy expression for the asymptotic
variance for all estimates T in this class. He did
not require recourse to the regularity assumptions
implicit in the substituting normal distributions for
approximately normal distributions, or in assuming
the variance of T was approximately constant, as
he had in his previous proof. It was then an easy
step to use standard Lagrangian methods to mini-
mize this asymptotic expression for the variance for
consistent estimates within this class and show the
resulting equations were those that also determined
the maximum likelihood estimate.
Fisher published this third proof later only in a
disguised form, namely where he assumed that the
estimate T was to be found from an estimating equa-
tion restricted to be a linear function of the rela-
tive frequencies; that is, without stating where he
had begun, he jumped directly to Euler’s Relation.
In that guise, and without the geometric setting
and intuition, it appeared in his 1935 paper (Fisher,
1935, pages 45–46) where it served to provide an im-
proved version of the demonstration that the max-
imum likelihood estimate achieves the information
lower bound. It also appeared in Fisher (1938, pages
30–32), a 45-page tract he put together for a visit to
India at Mahalonobis’s invitation in January 1938.
That tract was mostly cobbled together from Fisher’s
papers, and it summarized his view to that time.
And in his 1956 book, he gave (apparently only as an
illustration) another, simplified version, restricted to
estimates T that were themselves linear in the rela-
tive frequencies (Fisher, 1956, pages 145–148).
Hotelling’s role in this was that of an important
catalyst. He helped lead Fisher to reconsider the
problem and provided a remarkably acute audience,
but he himself did not contribute further to the the-
ory of maximum likelihood. Hotelling did write one
other related paper during his nearly six months
at Rothamsted in 1929. It was an investigation of
the differential geometry of parameter spaces, with
what is sometimes called the Jeffreys information
metric, after Jeffreys (1946) (Kass, 1989; Kass and
Vos, 1997). The paper, entitled “Spaces of statisti-
cal parameters,” included Type-III or gamma den-
sities as one example, must also have been writ-
ten by Hotelling at Rothamsted. On 27 December
1929, a summary of the paper was read by Oystein
Ore in Hotelling’s absence to the Annual Meeting of
the American Mathematical Society in Bethlehem,
Pennsylvania. Only an abstract was ever published,
but the summary Ore read survives (part of a thick
folder of other, later notes by Hotelling), and it is
printed here, together with the abstract (Hotelling,
1930a), as Appendix 3.
11. THE SITUATION TO 1950
In all, Fisher gave three proofs of the optimality of
maximum likelihood. The first, in 1922, was based
upon the erroneous belief that maximum likelihood
estimates were always sufficient statistics, and it de-
pended upon treating approximately normally dis-
tributed random variables as if they were in fact
normally distributed. The second proof, in 1925, was
what I called the ANOVA proof. It too required the
same implicit appeal to regularity by using normal-
ity in place of approximate normality, as well as
assuming that the asymptotic variances of the es-
timates were approximately constant, and that the
likelihood was sufficiently regular to permit the eval-
uation and manipulation of various integrals. The
third, in 1930 in correspondence (and later in print
in 1935 in a version restated in terms of estimat-
ing functions that lost the geometric origin), placed
more severe restrictions upon the distributions (as-
sumed multinomial) and estimates (smoothly dif-
ferentiable functions of the relative frequencies only,
not varying with sample size), but it yielded a more
satisfactory proof. Even if not all details were filled
in, that task was fairly easy for the limited setting
considered. Indeed, the third proof was immune to
the ugly little facts that Hotelling hinted at in 1930
and Hodges produced explicitly in 1951, but at a
cost in generality. Still, multinomial distributions
are as general as one could hope for in the discrete
case, and the intuition developed from the geometric
setting of that third proof provided at least superfi-
cial promise that the result held much more gener-
ally, for continuous parametric families.
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Over the next few years, several mathematicians
recognized the unsatisfactory extent of rigorous sup-
port given for such a broad theory and tried their
hands at filling in the gaps Fisher had knowingly
leapt over as well as some he had not even recog-
nized. The major early efforts were by Joseph Doob
(1934, 1936) and Abraham Wald (1943, 1949) in the
United States, Daniel Dugue´ (1937) in France, and
then Harald Crame´r (1946, 1946a) writing during
the war in isolation in Sweden (having read Fisher,
Doob, Dugue´, but apparently not Wald). Both Doob
and Wald had strong connections with Hotelling;
both pursued their studies of this topic on Carnegie
Fellowships working with Hotelling at Columbia,
Doob in 1934–1935, and Wald in 1938–1939. Doob
left for the University of Illinois in 1935, but Wald
stayed on at Columbia, replacing Hotelling in 1939–
1940 while Hotelling was on leave, and again per-
manently when Hotelling moved to North Carolina
in 1946.
Of these writers, Doob and Dugue´ fell into new
difficulties (as Hotelling had in his 1930 paper); Doob
was gently corrected by Wald, and Dugue´’s slip was
apparently first noticed a decade later, in the mid-
1940s by Edith Mourier, who brought it to Dar-
mois’s attention. The Wald and Crame´r treatments
were the most satisfactory; both raised the level of
rigor to new heights, although both suffered from
the complexity of the conditions assumed and the
limitations imposed. Wald was already publishing
on the theory of estimation by 1939, and his 1943
proof of the asymptotic sufficiency of the maximum
likelihood estimates can be seen as a form of the
completion of Fisher’s 1922 proof. Crame´r also was
firmly based on Fisher; indeed his development fol-
lowed the structure of Fisher’s work closely, but with
rigorous demonstrations and explicit statements of
conditions. Much of what Crame´r presented might
be seen as a realization of the book Fisher and
Hotelling might have written, albeit without the ge-
ometry.
While this reaction to Fisher’s theory (namely
that it was not true, or at least not proven as stated)
progressed in some quarters, another appeared,
namely claims that the theory was not new. In this
respect the reactions were like those in the seven-
teenth century to William Harvey’s 1628 demon-
stration of the circulation of blood, where denials
of the truth of the claimed phenomenon coexisted
with priority claims on behalf of Hippocrates, circa
400 bc (Stigler, 1999, pages 207ff). Karl Pearson
to his death and some others in his camp consid-
ered Fisher’s maximum likelihood simply the Gaus-
sian method, warmed over and served again with-
out overt reference to any Bayesian underpinnings.
That can be attributed to a lack of understanding of
what Fisher was accomplishing, a phenomenon that
afflicted even such first-class older statisticians as
G. Udny Yule. Yule’s otherwise excellent 1911 text-
book was frequently revised but never made more
than the most superficial reference to Fisher (other
than to his correction to Pearson on degrees of free-
dom), even to the 10th edition of 1936 (Yule, 1936).
Another, more recent claimant’s name was added
to Gauss’s in 1935 when Arthur Bowley, in moving
a vote of thanks for Fisher (1935), called attention
to work by Edgeworth in 1908–1909 that bore at
least superficial similarity to some of Fisher’s work,
namely the information inequality of the second of
the three proofs.
Bowley clearly had only a dim understanding of
this work of Fisher’s, and his remarks were mild
compared to those 15 years later by Jerzy Neyman.
Neyman’s difficulties with Fisher began in 1934 and
involved both scientific and personal issues, in what
would become a long-running feud. Generally the
dispute simmered at a low level: Fisher would, af-
ter the initial split, mostly ignore Neyman except
for occasional barbs (usually veiled, without men-
tioning Neyman by name), and Neyman would gen-
erally downplay the importance and originality of
Fisher’s work, rising on occasion for a more detailed
published blast (Zabell, 1992; Kruskal, 1980).
In 1937 Neyman had been content to attribute the
simple idea of maximum likelihood to Karl Pearson,
citing Pearson’s derivation of the product moment
estimate of the normal correlation coefficient as the
“most probable” value, using the Gaussian method
Pearson later abandoned (Neyman, 1937, page 345;
1938, pages 132, 136; Pearson, 1896, pages 262–265).
But in 1951 Neyman’s focus on Fisher reached a
peak, and he latched on to the claim of priority for
Edgeworth and deployed it as a rhetorical weapon
in the feud. In a review of the collection of papers
(Fisher, 1950), Neyman resurrected Bowley’s discov-
ery, accusing Fisher of “an unjustified claim of pri-
ority” with respect to “the so-called property of effi-
ciency of the maximum likelihood estimates” (Ney-
man, 1951). What is more, Neyman wrote, “Actu-
ally, the proofs of the efficiency of maximum likeli-
hood estimates offered both by Edgeworth and by
Fisher are inaccurate, and the assertion, taken at
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its full generality, is false.” This comes close to be-
ing an accusation of a false claim of priority for a
false discovery of an untrue fact, which would be
a rare triple-negative in the history of intellectual
property disputes. Savage (1976) wrote of Fisher
with this review in mind, “nor did he always emerge
as the undisputed champion in bad manners.” On
the other side, in 1938 Fisher had reviewed Ney-
man’s influential Lectures and Conferences on Math-
ematical Statistics (1938), a book which had only a
few grudging references to Fisher. Fisher’s review
consisted of only two sentences, the first innocu-
ous and the second, “There is not enough origi-
nal material to justify publication as a book, and
too much that is really trivial” (Fisher, 1938–1939).
In June 1951, Neyman also wrote to the editor of
the Journal of the American Statistical Association,
W. Allen Wallis, unsuccessfully requesting that the
Journal reprint Edgeworth’s 1908–1909 papers (let-
ter in Neyman papers, Bancroft Library).
But what of the basic question, did Edgeworth
precede Fisher and did he in any way influence him
if he did? My own view, which is in general accord
with the conclusions Jimmie Savage (1976, pages
447–448) and particularly John Pratt (1976) came
to from a detailed study of both Edgeworth and
Fisher, is that while there was indeed merit to Edge-
worth’s work on this, there was no merit to the 1951
accusation of “an unjustified claim of priority.” In
the course of a long, obscure and rambling series
of papers emphasizing the use of inverse probabil-
ity in estimation, Edgeworth did include a treat-
ment of what he called “the direct method free from
the speculative character which attaches to inverse
probability.” He made what can in retrospect be
best interpreted as a statement that maximizing the
likelihood within a very restricted class of estimates
(basicallyM -estimates for location parameters) gives
the estimate with smallest standard deviation. The
proof he offered (suggested by Professor A. E. H.
Love, an expert on the calculus of variations) was
based explicitly upon Schwarz’s inequality, and bore
no resemblance to any Fisher gave.
There is no indication that this work of Edge-
worth’s ever had any influence upon Fisher or any
other worker on this topic. And the obscurity of
the prose—uncommonly dense, even by Edgewor-
thian standards—is such that it is hard to believe
the result would have been recognized there by any
contemporary reader other than Edgeworth him-
self. Even at a later time, its recognition required a
reader with Fisher’s work in hand and either exten-
sive experience with Edgeworth or a strong histor-
ical or personal motive. Bowley had studied Edge-
worth’s work and mode of expression thoroughly in
preparing an extended commemorative summary in
1928. Neyman had both historical and personal mo-
tives, as well as Bowley’s 1935 prompt. Even to-
day anyone who tries to learn what Edgeworth ac-
complished from Bowley’s 1928 summary (Bowley,
1928, pages 26–28) would emerge completely at sea,
no matter how long the text is puzzled over. This
is not to deny that when one has dug through the
thicket of the 1908–1909 original, there is a limited
result and a hint of understanding that went be-
yond the limited result. Edgeworth was a statisti-
cal scientist with an uncommonly subtle and deep
mind (Stigler, 1986, Chapter 9; 1999, Chapter 5),
and his work here is further evidence of that. But,
for all that, the work stands as an independent par-
tial anticipation—a hint, not an instance, of what
was to come.
Edgeworth died in 1926 without ever commenting
on Fisher, and Fisher, as was his wont, dug in his
heels and refused to seriously engage the issue in
print. His frankest private statements were in two
letters. The first was a 12 February 1940 letter to
Maurice Fre´chet, where he described Edgeworth’s
statement as confusingly linked to inverse proba-
bility, even though the mathematics could be dis-
sociated from that approach. In that letter Fisher
summed up his view in these words: “The confu-
sion of associating this method with Bayes’ theorem
seems to have been originally due to Gauss, who
certainly recognized its merits as a method of esti-
mation, though I do not know whether he proved
anything definite about it. I do not know of any
explicit statement of the properties, consistency, ef-
ficiency and sufficiency, which may characterize es-
timates prior to my 1922 paper” (Bennett, 1990,
page 125). The second letter, dated 2 July 1951, was
to a Californian, Horace Gray, who had spent time
with Fisher in London 1935–1936, and he had writ-
ten to Fisher to call attention to Neyman’s review.
Fisher replied,
“Neyman is, judging from my own experi-
ence, a malicious mischief-maker. . . . Edge-
worth’s paper of 1908 has, of course, been
long familiar to me, and to other English
statisticians. No one could now read it
without realizing that the author was pro-
foundly confused. I should say, for my own
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part, that he certainly had an inkling of
what I later demonstrated. The view that,
in any proper sense, he anticipated me is
made difficult by a number of verifiable
facts” (Bennett, 1990, pages 138–139).
The facts Fisher listed were that (i) Edgeworth
based his investigation on inverse probability, (ii)
he limited attention to location parameters, and (iii)
the formula they shared in common, for the variance
of efficient estimates, had been drawn from Pearson
and Filon with no notice given to the major errors
in that work. Fisher noted that since by 1903 Shep-
pard’s works had shown that moment estimates had
variances different from those given by Pearson and
Filon, this to Fisher raised the questions: “Had Pear-
son and Filon’s variances any validity at all? Does
any class of estimate actually have these variances?
If so, how can such an estimate be obtained in gen-
eral? But Edgeworth would have been far ahead of
his time had he asked them.” Fisher would grant
Edgeworth “an inkling,” but no more. Some might
see more in Edgeworth than Fisher did, but they do
so from a different historical perspective. I believe
Fisher owed no intellectual debt to Edgeworth on
this issue, and it was his own loss. Had he taken the
time and trouble to learn from Edgeworth’s insight,
he might have gone even further. Savage (1976) prof-
fered as explanations for this neglect, that Fisher ini-
tially thought Edgeworth’s premises ridiculous, and
later “because it is hard to seek diligently after the
unwelcome.”
Neyman’s was not the only review to raise pri-
ority issues about Fisher’s work. In a tendentious
1930 review of the 3rd edition of Fisher’s Statisti-
cal Methods for Research Workers, Charles Grove
seemed to claim that all in Fisher was to be found
earlier in Scandinavian work by Thiele, Gram or
Charlier. Grove (1930) did not focus on maximum
likelihood, which he evidently thought was unsup-
ported, but put forth instead the claim that Thiele
had in 1889 anticipated Fisher on small sample infer-
ence and particularly on estimating cumulants with
k-statistics, and Gram had done so on the use of or-
thogonal polynomials in regression. Fisher replied in
the same publication, and more colorfully in a pri-
vate letter to Grove’s colleague Arne Fisher (a Dane
who seems to have been the instigator of Grove’s re-
view). Fisher stated that Thiele “had no more glim-
mer than [Karl] Pearson of some of the ideas we
now use” (Grove, 1930; Fisher, 1931; Bennett, 1990,
page 313). A scrupulous recent translation of Thiele
from the Danish (Lauritzen, 2002) with accompa-
nying commentary allows a better assessment of his
excellent work, which, however, did not include con-
tributions to maximum likelihood estimation.
12. DOUBTS ABOUT MAXIMUM
LIKELIHOOD
The possibility that maximum likelihood estimates
could actually perform badly, or that they might
be dramatically improved upon by another method,
seems to have not been raised prior to Hotelling’s
probing letters to Fisher of November 15 and De-
cember 12, 1930. Kirstine Smith and Karl Pearson
had questioned the relative merits of the “Gaus-
sian method” versus minimum chi-square in 1916,
but any difference there was minor; both were later
seen to be asymptotically efficient estimates. For
the most part, the early reservations about Fisher’s
maximum likelihood centered on questions of pri-
ority (was he preceded? was anything really new in
the method?) and issues of practical usefulness (were
the calculations too hard relative to the method of
moments?). As maximum likelihood became more
widely adopted in the 1930s, the increased atten-
tion to proofs of its effectiveness (could a rigorous
general demonstration be devised?) led inevitably to
questions of when it might break down. The earliest
explicit example is perhaps due to Abraham Wald,
in correspondence with Jerzy Neyman in 1938.
Wald immigrated to the United States from Vi-
enna in Spring 1938, when shortly after Hitler’s an-
nexation of Austria he accepted an offer to join the
Cowles Commission for Research in Economics, then
located in Colorado Springs. He remained with Cowles
through the summer before joining Harold Hotelling
at Columbia University in Fall 1938. On Septem-
ber 20, 1938, a week before he left for Columbia,
Wald wrote to Neyman sending a promised manuscript
on the Markov inequality, but also describing a dif-
ferent problem he had encountered. The problem de-
scribed was a slight generalization of one he would
treat in Wald (1940), namely estimating a straight
line when n points on the line are observed but both
coordinates are subject to independent errors. How-
ever, Wald’s letter to Neyman contained a statement
that he omitted from the 1940 article: “I have shown
that the method of maximum likelihood leads to
false estimations of the parameters. . . . (i.e., leads to
statistics of which the stochastic limits are unequal
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to the values of the respective parameters to be es-
timated). Hence the maximum likelihood method
cannot be applied” (Neyman Papers, Box 14, Folder
28). Wald stated that he had solved this general es-
timation problem for the case of independent nor-
mally distributed errors with possibly unequal vari-
ances.4
Neyman replied on September 23 that he was quite
interested in the new problem, “the more so as it
is rather close to what I am trying to do myself.”
Ten years later Neyman and Elizabeth Scott pub-
lished, with a general citation to Wald (1940), a sim-
plified version of Wald’s example as one of several
with increasing numbers of parameters where maxi-
mum likelihood estimates are inconsistent. That ver-
sion, in which the straight line is y = x and the
two coordinates’ error variances are equal, has come
to be known as the Neyman–Scott example. It is
usually expressed as follows: Xij are independent
N(µj, σ
2), for i= 1,2, and j = 1, . . . , n, in which case
the maximum likelihood estimate of σ2 consistently
estimates half the correct value (Neyman and Scott,
1948).
In June of 1951, just as Jerzy Neyman’s review
of Fisher’s Collected Papers appeared, the Berke-
ley Statistical Laboratory convened for the summer
under Neyman’s general direction. One of three re-
search groups took as its charge “a complex of ques-
tions arising from considerations of superefficiency
and identifiability.” The group concentrating on this
topic was comprised of Joseph L. Hodges, Jr., Lu-
cien Le Cam and Agnes Berger. It was presumably
shortly before that time that Hodges, then an As-
sistant Professor at Berkeley, constructed his exam-
ple; in any event the study was soon sufficiently ad-
vanced that a session on the topic “Efficiency and
superefficiency of estimates” was arranged by Ney-
man to be held on Saturday, December 29, 1951, at
the Boston meeting of the Institute of Mathematical
Statistics. Four talks were presented in that session,
by Jerzy Neyman (“On the problem of asymptotic
efficiency of estimates”), Joe Hodges (“Local super-
efficiency”), Lucien Le Cam (“On sets of parameter
points where it is possible to achieve superefficiency
of estimates”) and Joseph Berkson (“Relative preci-
sion of least squares and maximum likelihood esti-
mates of regression coefficients”) (Biometrics, 1951;
4If the observed points’ means are modeled as a random
sample, the parameters do not grow in number with the sam-
ple size and their maximum likelihood estimates are consistent
under mild conditions; see Kiefer and Wolfowitz (1956).
Littauer and Mode, 1952). Neither Neyman’s nor
Hodges’s talks were ever published; Le Cam’s was
developed into his Ph.D. dissertation and published
in 1953. That publication (Le Cam, 1953) included
Hodges’s example (credited to Hodges), and Le Cam
proved among other things that while superefficiency
was clearly possible, the set of parameter points
where it could be achieved had Lebesgue measure
zero.
In the decade that followed, a number of other
examples were discovered or devised. Of these, the
least contrived was the problem of estimation for the
five-parameter mixture of two normal distributions,
where the likelihood function explodes to infinity
when either mean parameter equals any observation.
This and several other examples, including an im-
portant one by Bahadur, are reviewed in Le Cam
(1990) and Cox (2006, Chapter 7). Le Cam specu-
lates that the normal mixture example (known in
the folklore of the 1950s but apparently not pub-
lished then) was due to Jack Kiefer and Jacob Wol-
fowitz; Cox (2006, pages 134–135) considers it to
some extent pathological.
These early examples created a flurry of excite-
ment but are for the most part not seen today as
debilitating to the theory. Hodges’s example made
a substantial impact when it first became known,
but it has, ever since Le Cam’s dissertation, come to
be seen as an ingenious but minor technical achieve-
ment. Hodges (see Figure 1 above) showed you could
improve locally on maximum likelihood, basically by
shrinking the estimate toward zero, and as such it
might also be viewed as an early hint of the 1955
shrinkage estimates of Charles Stein that in multi-
parameter problems can improve uniformly on max-
imum likelihood. But Hodges’s example itself was
for finite samples inferior to maximum likelihood
for parameter values not near zero, and it was not
long seen as a serious threat. The Wald–Neyman–
Scott example was of more practical import, and
still serves as a warning of what might occur in
modern highly parameterized problems, where the
information in the data may be spread too thinly to
achieve asymptotic consistency. The normal mixture
example remains certainly of at least computational
importance, as showing how in complex settings it
may be necessary to seek local maxima or to con-
strain the parameter space. Fisher never commented
on any of these examples.
There continued over this period to be a num-
ber of attempts to complete the theory, to give a
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rigorous description of conditions that approached
necessary and sufficient, conditions describing situ-
ations in which maximum likelihood would not mis-
lead. As work on the topic became more refined and
more correct, the intrinsic difficulties of the topic
also became more apparent. The lists of conditions
needed to prove optimality by Wald and Crame´r
were already unwieldy and the basic logic of the
solutions retreated from sight; indeed one problem
was that achieving rigor sometimes led to the ex-
clusion of basic examples, such as the estimation of
the normal standard deviation, as in Wald (1943).
The consequences can still be seen today, in the best
textbook treatments, such as those by Bickel and
Doksum (2001) and by van der Vaart (1998), where
the elegance of the exposition comes from strate-
gically restricting the range of the coverage. Ba-
hadur (1964) gave a succinct and elegant theorem
that builds upon work of Le Cam, but only treated
a one-dimensional parameter and was restricted to
estimates that are asymptotically normal with vari-
ances that are continuous in the parameter.
13. OF ERRORS IN THEORY
At many junctures in this story we have encoun-
tered what might be judged theoretical errors com-
mitted by the workers involved. Perhaps Lagrange,
by ignoring the curve his probabilities followed un-
til the final stage, could be judged in error; it cer-
tainly left him with method of moment estimates
that would be thought woefully inefficient by the
Fisher generation. Perhaps Gauss’s use of a uni-
form prior, which rendered his solution susceptible
to change by nonlinear transformations of the pa-
rameters, would be considered an error. Certainly
Pearson and Filon erred in their promiscuous use
of a na¨ıve passage to a limit in ways where it gave
wrong answers (Stigler, 2007). And certainly Fisher’s
1921 assumption that sufficient statistics always ex-
ist was an error, and Hotelling’s 1930 proof of the
consistency and asymptotic normality of the maxi-
mum likelihood estimate cannot be counted correct
for the generality claimed.
There are other errors I have not discussed. When
Lambert (1760) in a sketchy presentation gave only
one example, he got what was arguably the wrong
answer there. Lambert’s only specific result was for
n= 2, claiming the sample mean in that case always
gave the most probable result, a claim that would
fail for the Cauchy density. See Stigler (1999, Chap-
ter 16). And there were later smaller and subtler
lapses in rigor in attempts by Doob and by Dugue´ to
themselves correct some of Fisher’s oversights. But I
do not mean at all to suggest these pioneers had feet
of clay. To the contrary. Without Lagrange’s error
he might not have found the Laplace transform at
that early date. Without Pearson and Filon, Fisher
might not have started down the road he did. With-
out Fisher’s 1921 mistaken jump to a conclusion,
he might not have rushed to complete his theory,
which even flawed and incomplete, was instrumen-
tal in launching twentieth century theoretical statis-
tics. Great explorations in uncharted territory seem
to require great boldness, and even mischance can
lead to major advance.
14. CONCLUSION
Despite all these difficulties, maximum likelihood
remains one of the most used and useful techniques
of modern statistics. How can that be, in the face of
the nasty little facts uncovered by the 1950s? For one
thing, there is solid mathematical support in a wide
class of problems. Fisher’s proofs can all be defended
as correct, at least if one accepts as given the regu-
larity conditions and assumptions that were clearly
implicit, including the limitation in 1922 to sufficient
estimates, and in 1925 to score functions linearly
approximable by maximum likelihood estimates. Of
course that defense flirts with tautology: any state-
ment is true if all the conditions required for its
truth are assumed; even the Pearson–Filon deriva-
tion of the “probable errors of frequency constants”
might be so defended. But there is a big difference
between the two cases. Fisher’s implicit assumptions
are in part fairly clear (smooth differentiability, con-
sistent estimates, e.g.) and were clearly evident to
Fisher himself; if he made a false application of the
theory, it is not known to me. On the other hand,
with Pearson–Filon the case was different, as the
inappropriate applications in the same paper make
clear. Nonetheless, the intense mathematical inves-
tigations after 1938 and particularly in the 1950s
revealed potential problems Fisher had not consid-
ered, with increasing numbers of parameters, un-
bounded likelihood functions and the possibility of
local improvement over maximum likelihood. Fisher
was surely aware of some of these problems, at least
when they were published, if not before. The first
of them he might have countered by noting that
in such situations the amount of information in the
data (the measurement of which was one of his pi-
oneering advances) was being spread over a space
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of dimension increasing in proportion with the sam-
ple size, and so of course problems with consistency
could be expected. But he did not. The third pos-
sibility, local improvement, had been brought early
to his attention by Hotelling, but here too Fisher
remained silent, as he did in the face of other exam-
ples as well. An explanation for this silence might,
ironically, have been given by Fisher himself in a 14
January 1933 letter to Egon Pearson, commiserating
with him on the difficulties he faced with his father,
Karl: “Many original men are for that reason unre-
ceptive, and this is a fault which age does nothing
to cure” (Fisher papers).
Personalities played a role in this development.
Fisher’s hostilities with Neyman surely increased his
stubborn resistance to public discussion of areas where
questions remained, and they surely contributed to
the zeal with which Neyman pursued the discovery
and public discussion of such problems. The latter
might be viewed as a benefit of the feud: when peace
reigned in the early 1930s and the only attention
to the problem was by Fisher, Hotelling, and those
Hotelling inspired to work on this (Doob, Wald) or a
noncombatant (Dugue´), the problems in the proofs
and the limitations of the theory were not on pub-
lic view. Indeed, there has been no published crit-
icism that clearly identified the source of errors in
the proofs of Hotelling, Doob or Dugue´ even to the
present day; either the early works were ignored,
were merely cited, or referred to with a polite al-
lusion such as to the proofs being “not rigorous”
(e.g., Doob, 1934; Le Cam, 1953). The reader got
no sense of where and how real problems with the
theory might arise. Hostility bred uncivil discourse;
it also led to principled focus.
Yet despite these problems, time and again maxi-
mum likelihood has proved useful even in situations
where no general theorem could be found to de-
fend its use. Perhaps as Fisher’s powerful geomet-
ric intuition may have foreseen, the scope of useful
application of maximum likelihood exceeds that of
any reasonably achievable proof, even though this
comes at the potential cost of inadvertently blunder-
ing into a region of inapplicability. We now under-
stand the limitations of maximum likelihood better
than Fisher did, but far from well enough to guar-
antee safety in its application in complex situations
where it is most needed. Maximum likelihood re-
mains a truly beautiful theory, even though tragedy
may lurk around a corner.
APPENDIX 1: FISHER’S DECEMBER 1928
DRAFT TABLE OF CONTENTS [HOTELLING
PAPERS, BOX 3]
I. Distributions
Varieties and variables
Types of distribution
(a) Discontinuous, step like integrals
(b) Continuous, differentiable integrals
(c) General type, integral not differentiable
but frequency not confined to zero measure
Specification by moments
Characteristic function,
∫
eitxf(x)dx or∫
eitx dF (x)
Its logarithm, cumulative property
Cumulative moment functions or seminvariants
[sic]
Illustrative cases, uniqueness of normal distri-
bution, multinomial and multiple Poisson
II. Distributions derived from normal
χ2 distribution is that of Sn1 (x
2
p) when xp is dis-
tributed with unit variance about zero
Transformation of ξq =
∑n
p=1 cpqxp,∑n
p=1 c
2
pq = 1,
∑n
p=1 cpqcpq′ = 0
Application of χ2 to frequencies
Distribution of t = nx¯χ2 [sic]; application to re-
gression coefficients; of z = 12 log
n2χ21
n1χ22
.
III. Distribution of correlation coefficient, partial cor-
relation, multiple correlation. Hyperspace treat-
ment
IV. Moment estimates of seminvariants
Simple and multiple distribution of such esti-
mates {paper in Lond. Math. Soc. They will
not publish for a year if then}
Combinatorial method
V. Theory of estimation
(Much as already done but more about Suffi-
cient Statistics)
Method of maximum likelihood
Bayes’ theorem. Inverse probability and likeli-
hood. Illustrate by inefficiency of moments with
Pearsonian curves.
VI. Experimental design (not so agricultural as in
Statistical Methods for Research Workers), more
use of amount of information
VII. Statistical mechanics; argument put in a clear
light without taking x! as a continuous function
when x is small! NOT YET DONE!
Analogous biological problems. Rather worth
doing though.
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Fowler has now done a great deal, but still the
method of steepest descent seems very indirect,
and obviously this limits statistical argument.
APPENDIX 2: FISHER’S ENCLOSURE A
FROM THE NOV. 28, 1930 LETTER TO
HOTELLING. THE LETTERS WERE TYPED
BUT THE FORMULAS WERE WRITTEN IN
BY HAND, AND THE APPARENT
TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR IN THE FOURTH
FORMULA FROM THE BOTTOM ( ∂θ
∂X1
FOR ∂φ
∂X1
) IS AS WRITTEN IN THE ORIGINAL
[HOTELLING PAPERS, BOX 45]
Expectation line x= f(θ)
Equistatistical surface (or region) T = φ(x1, . . . , xs)∑
x
∂φ
∂x
= 0 if φ is homogeneous of zero degree.
For consistency θ = φ(f1, . . . , fs)
For large samples, provided there is no bias of or-
der as high as n−1/2,
V (T ) =Mean
(∑ ∂φ
∂x
δx
)2
=
∑
f
(
1− b
x
)(
∂φ
∂x
)2
−
∑∑ ff ′
n
∂φ
∂x
∂φ
∂x′
for multinomial, where differentials refer to the ex-
pectation point.
Differentiating the condition of consistency, dθ =
(
∑ ∂φ
∂x
∂f
∂θ )dθ, or
∑ ∂φ
∂x
∂f
∂θ = 1
Any values ∂φ∂x are admissible subject to this condi-
tion for consistency, we may therefore minimize the
expression for the variance subject to this condition
and obtain equations of the form
f1(θ)
∂θ
∂x1
− f1
n
∑
f
∂φ
∂x
= λ
∂f1
∂θ
Now if φ is homogeneous in x of zero degree,∑
f ∂φ∂x = 0, hence, for all classes
∂φ
∂x
=
λ
f
∂f
∂θ
or
∂φ
∂x
=
1
f
∂f
∂θ
/∑ 1
f
(
∂f
∂θ
)2
The criterion of consistency thus fixes the value of T
at all points on the expectation line, while the crite-
rion of efficiency in conjunction with it fixes the di-
rection in which the equistatistical surface cuts that
line. All statistics which are both consistent and ef-
ficient thus have surfaces which touch on that line.
The surface for Maximum Likelihood has the plane
surface of this type.
APPENDIX 3: HOTELLING ON
PARAMETER SPACES
Hotelling briefly attended the American Math-
ematical Society’s Annual Meeting in Bethlehem,
Pennsylvania, December 26–29, 1929, but he left be-
fore this paper was scheduled to be read on Decem-
ber 27. The paper was read in his absence by Profes-
sor Oystein Ore of Yale University, and Ore subse-
quently returned the manuscript to Hotelling; only
the abstract was ever published (Hotelling, 1930a).
Meanwhile, Hotelling traveled on to the AMS Reg-
ular Meeting December 30–31 in Des Moines, Iowa,
where on December 31 he read his paper “The con-
sistency and ultimate distribution of optimum statis-
tics” (Hotelling, 1930). The summary that follows
is the entire manuscript as read by Ore, from the
Hotelling Papers at Columbia University (Box 44).
SPACES OF STATISTICAL PARAMETERS
By Harold Hotelling, Stanford University.
[Abstract]
For a space of n dimensions representing the pa-
rameters p1, . . . , pn of a frequency distribution, a sta-
tistically significant metric is defined by means of
the variances and co-variances of efficient estimates
of these parameters. Such a space, for the ordinary
types of distributions, is always curved. For the two
parameters of the normal law the manifold may be
represented in part as a surface of revolution of neg-
ative curvature, with a sharp circular edge. On this
surface variation of the dispersion is represented by
moving along a generator. For a Pearson Type III
curve [i.e. gamma distributions] of any given shape
the same surface occurs. For the unrestricted Type
III curve there are three parameters; their space is
investigated. Certain metrical properties which hold
in general for spaces of statistical parameters are
given.
SUMMARY OF “SPACES OF
STATISTICAL PARAMETERS”
A “population” is specified by a function
f(x, p1, . . . , pk)
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such that f dx is the probability of an observation
falling in the range dx. In statistical theory we have
given observations x1, . . . , xN and wish to estimate
the values of the parameters p1, . . . , pk. There is an
infinity of possible methods of making these esti-
mates; but one possessing certain peculiarly valu-
able properties is that of maximum likelihood. The
likelihood is defined as
N∏
i=1
f(xi, p1, . . . , pk).
Denote its logarithm by L. Let pˆ1, . . . , pˆk be the val-
ues maximizing L. They have been called optimum
statistics, or optimum estimates of the parameters,
by R. A. Fisher. The errors of estimate pˆα − pα de-
rived from samples of N have a distribution which
for large values of N approaches the normal form
Ke−
1
2
Tdpˆ1, . . . , dpˆk,
where
T =
∑∑
gαβ(pˆα − pα)(pˆβ − pβ).
Here gαβ is the mathematical expectation of
∂2L
∂pα ∂pβ
,
and is a covariant tensor of second order under trans-
formations p′α = φα(p1, . . . , pk)—though of course the
second derivative is not itself a tensor.
This tensor property suggests that
gαβ dp
α dpβ
be taken as distance element in a space of coordi-
nates p1, . . . , pk. Indeed a considerable amount of
differential geometry carries over immediately to give
novel statistical conclusions. It should be said at
once that these spaces are not flat, but are curved
in a manner depending on the initial population dis-
tributions.
Problems of “random migration” by short leaps
in the k-space occur in various biological problems,
when evolution is supposed to take place by small
mutations. Such problems occur also in experimen-
tal work, as in the dilution method of counting soil
bacteria developed by Cutter at Rothamsted. These
problems, for short steps, are equivalent to prob-
lems regarding heat conduction and geodesics in the
curved space.
If we are considering an initial distribution curve
of any fixed shape, we have two parameters to es-
timate, giving the location and scale of the curve,
for example the mean and standard deviation of a
normal error curve. Our k-space is in such cases a
surface of constant negative curvature. Represent-
ing the normal curve by means of a pseudosphere,
variation of the standard deviation is represented by
motion along a generator, variations of the mean by
rotation about the axis. A greater variance means
closer propinquity to the axis.
Since a geodesic on a pseudosphere between two
points on the same meridian comes closer to the axis
than the meridian, we have an interesting biological
conclusion. If we have two related species having
about the same variance but a difference in means,
the most likely common ancestors had a greater vari-
ance than either existing species.
For a Pearson Type III curve the measures of po-
sition and scale vary, not along geodesic but along
loxodromes.
Spaces of statistical parameters lend themselves
to the treatment of a wide range of problems in
which discrepancies between hypothesis and obser-
vation which involve two or more observations are
to be tested. Thus if the hypothesis to be tested is
that a species, in which the frequency distribution of
some dimension has the normal form, has arisen by
a succession of small mutations from another, and
if we consider the difference of the variances along
with that of the means, we are led to apply the dis-
tribution of χ2 for n= 2, just as in judging marks-
manship we may combine vertical with horizontal
deviations of a shot from the center of the target.
But the fact that the surface, on which the mean and
variance are coordinates, is a pseudosphere instead
of a plane, shows that a correction must be applied
to the probability of a greater deviation as calcu-
lated from χ2. Indeed, the area or circumference of
a geodesic circle is greater than for one of the same
radius on a plane. The excess of area measures the
correction which must be applied to obtain the true
probability of a greater discrepancy.
If about a point on the pseudosphere represent-
ing any population we describe a geodesic circle, the
points on the circumference represent statistics, such
as mean and variance, which might with equal likeli-
hood have been obtained in a sample from this pop-
ulation. And inversely, if corresponding to a given
sample, we fix upon a point as center of a geodesic
circle, the points on the circumference represent pop-
ulations which, on the evidence of this sample, are
all equally likely.
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